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PROSPECTS FOR A GENERAL THEORY OF ECONOMIC
REGULATION
THOMAS D. BARTON*
A general theory of economic regulation ideally would draw together
the diverse techniques that constrain or direct economic activity; it would
guide our decisions about which economic activities are in need of regulation;
and it would specify the appropriate combination of regulatory mechanisms
that would best resolve particular problems. The theory would project the
costs of regulation and would foresee any undesirable side-effects. Finally,
it would assess the likelihood of achieving transcendent social or economic
goals. An effective general theory of regulation would be a breakthrough
in human governance rivalling any in modem political history.
Unfortunately, as two recent commentators put it, "[A]t present, there
is no general theory of regulatory design with sufficient power to furnish
good guidance on particular questions."' Too much depends, they say, on
general institutional and political developments, on idiosyncratic personali-
ties, and on the subtle factual details of the regulatory setting.2 Moreover,
regulation creates trade-offs and side-effects of such diversity and possible
volatility that "[u]nder many conditions, we might simply wish to opt for
no regulation at all .... '3 These observations remain valid, and no break-
through is at hand. In the short term, the value of attempted general
theories will be only to inform legislators about alternative forms of regu-
latory mechanisms and to raise warnings against the possible clumsiness,
inefficiency, or side-effects of legislative efforts. The formulation and ac-
ceptance of a more powerful theory awaits a broader political and academic
consensus about how economic behavior is influenced, about how regulation
and its effects should be studied, and about the ultimate purposes of
regulation.
Studies of the meaning and effects of regulation diverge in at least three
ways. First, studies of regulation may proceed from different philosophical
perspectives, which I label the "microeconomic," the "systemic," and the
"cultural." Each perspective is directed by different underlying assumptions
that affect analysis and conclusions. Secondly, studies of regulation vary in
their sociological focus. Authors concentrate on the state, or interest groups,
or individuals-whatever level is seen as the mainspring of regulatory
* Roscoe P. Posten and Hale J. Posten Professor of Law, West Virginia University
College of Law. B.A. Tulane University, 1971; J.D. Cornell Law School, 1974; Ph.D.
Cambridge University, England, 1982. The author expresses deep gratitude to Jeff Lewin and
Marie Ashe for their helpful comments in revising this manuscript.
1. E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: Tim PROBLEM OF REGULATORY
UNREASONABLENESS 302 (1982).
2. Id. at 303-04.
3. Id. at 304.
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success. 4 Finally, the goal of the studies may be informational, seeking
factual, scientific insights, or alternatively may be critical, assessing regu-
lation with reference to various transcendent social, political, or economic
values. For simplicity, the former approach will be termed "neutral" and
the latter "prescriptive."
The divergence in philosophical perspective is the most important of
these three differences. By shifting from the dominant microeconomic
perspective to the systemic and cultural perspectives, apparent contradictions
among various studies stemming from differences in focus and from dif-
ferences about the relative importance of facts or values may be reconciled.
Therefore, the crucial difference in perspective is explored at some length
in part I of this Essay. Part II will survey the major disagreements of focus
in regulatory studies, and will describe how such divergences affect both
the meanings placed on regulation and the implied solutions to regulatory
shortcomings. Certain disagreements in focus theoretically could be inte-
grated into a successful general theory. Other points of departure, however,
seem mutually exclusive, and thereby inhibit the creation of a larger theory.
Part III uses the systemic perspective to speculate about the most promising
structure for a general theory, and suggests the major elements of that
theory. Finally, part IV adopts the cultural perspective, posing questions
about the effects of regulation on human aspirations.
I. EXPLORING THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSPECTIVE
The dismantling of various government controls over commerce in the
past ten years cannot be fully understood, nor should any recommendations
about possible reregulation in the 1990s be made, without considering effects
from at least three different perspectives: the microeconomic, the systemic,
and the cultural. Each of these three perspectives from which regulation
can be analyzed employs a particular language or set of assumptions that
illustrates what is distinctive about that perspective. For the microeconomic
perspective, the assumptions are grounded in the efficacy of cost/benefit
analysis. The success and desirability of regulation are measured against
standards of efficiency and wealth distribution. For the systemic perspective,
the starting assumptions raise issues of effectiveness, propriety, and the
limits of human control. For the cultural perspective, the assessments focus
on meanings and values, addressing who we are and what we wish to
become.
The language of microeconomics and cost/benefit analysis powerfully
dominates public discourse in the latter half of the twentieth century, and
4. See D. McCAF y, OSHA AND Tim PoLMcs OF HEALTH REGULATION 2-19 (1982).
I am greatly indebted to this work. McCaffrey develops a valuable framework that analyzes
whether regulatory phenomena prove a general hypothesis about regulation based on pluralism,
or organizational theory, or "Capitalist State" theory. In this Essay I use a slightly expanded
version of McCaffrey's categories to illustrate the differences in focus of various regulatory
studies, without attempting to show that any of the three theories is more important than the
others.
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studies of regulation are no exception. 5 The reasons for this are several.
Although rational rather than empirical, microeconomic theory is grounded
in descriptions of human behavior that resonate psychologically with any
of us who have haggled over the price of an automobile or an antique. By
its own assumptions, moreover, the theory is coherent and all-inclusive: the
marketplace accords every nuance of decision a place in the aggregate of
individual self-maximizing actions that constitute a final valuation. Finally,
microeconomic discourse is fairly accessible, proceeding from a simple vision
of human motivation and allowing clear, relatively uncomplicated, and
seemingly precise examples in support of its conclusions. Indeed, it seems
intuitively correct to pair an economic mode of analysis with issues about
our economic lives. Much can be learned about particular regulatory issues
from this perspective.
Yet the coupling of an economic methodology to an economic problem
is not necessary, and can actually be confining and misleading with regard
to the larger issues that touch regulation. Breaking apart the subject matter
from the method of inquiry may reveal facets of the problem that otherwise
would remain concealed. Microeconomic theory generally focuses on indi-
viduals, and assesses their aggregate behaviors by the criteria of efficiency
and (less often) distribution of wealth. Political and social factors are a
concern for microeconomic analysis only if they result in policies or habits
that affect market transactions.6 State actions are judged by the same criteria
as individual actions, and are thereby characterized either as unwarranted
intrusions into the marketplace or as needed market corrections.
Systemic and cultural factors are hence largely absent from microecon-
omic assessments about deregulation or reregulation. Little information, for
example, is revealed about the effects of various institutions on our concepts
of needs and desires. Pareto efficiency (that is, that no further Pareto
superior moves can be made) can be achieved under any set of institutional
arrangements. Developing a general theory of regulation that would suggest
alternative arrangements to give us better procedures or better institutions
is unlikely to be achieved using only cost/benefit analysis. Assessments of
alternative institutional arrangements are unquestionably richer when the
microeconomic perspective is supplemented with the systemic and cultural
perspectives. These alternative perspectives allow us to test any efficiency-
derived conclusions against the assumptions-different from those that drive
the microeconomic perspective-that persons differently situated may hold
5. See, e.g., G. BECKER, THE EcoNoic APPROACH TO HumAN BEHAVIOR (1976); M.
DERTHICK & P. QurllK, THE PoLmcs oF DaEEOusLATIoN 246 (1985); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); Chickering, Regulation: Hopes and Realities, in REGuLATING
Busrnass: THE SEARCH FOR AN OPTNaiu 219, 225 (D.P. Jacobs ed. 1978) [hereinafter REau-
LATiNG Busi-Ess]; Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
6. For a notable exception, see Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in SOCIAL RESPON-
sntUrrims AND THE Busn-sm PREDICAMENT 135-168 (J. McKie ed. 1974), in which the costs and
benefits of regulation are directly linked to political and psychological factors.
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knowledge or problems in different ways, and that goals beyond wealth
maximization influence people and governments.
This Essay therefore avoids microeconomic language in favor of a
vocabulary about systems, and in brief conclusion, about culture. Through
the systems perspective the current dissension as to the proper focus of
regulatory studies may be resolvable; if so, we enable an inquiry about a
general theory of regulatory design. Through the cultural perspective we
may reconcile approaches to regulation that presume value neutrality with
those that advocate specific goals; if so, we enable an inquiry into what we
choose.
II. DIVERGENCE OF Focus IN STUDYING ECONOMIc REGULATION
As stated above, analyses of the development, history, and success of
economic regulation diverge in underlying assumptions, in sociological focus,
and in neutral or prescriptive aim, affecting not only how the issues of
regulation are framed, but the solutions that are implied. In this part II of
the Essay, the effects of shifting attention among the state, interest groups,
and individuals will be examined. To aid analytical clarity, these distinctions
have been sharply drawn into what appear as mutually exclusive categories.
That is overly simple: some authors could be described as focusing on more
than one sociological level, and certain theories about regulation, such as
the well-known "capture" theory, blur the boundaries between the catego-
ries. The ideal model provides a taxonomy of broad tendencies.
A. Regulation as Actions by the State
Studies that focus on the state as the primary initiator and implementor
of regulation diverge in the explanatory model used to fill out the meaning
of the concept of "state." They share, however, a top-down hierarchical
view of society with the state seen as capable of commanding legislation
and directing its implementation. The motivation for promulgating regula-
tory legislation, and also the criteria of its success or failure, vary with the
explanatory model used to comprehend the state.
Traditional conceptions of the state7 include the juristic model, like that
of Kelsen, in which the state is a system of laws and norms with underived
authority;8 the Hegelian image, in which the state is viewed as a directing
intelligence, not as a social agency;9 the associational or contractual state
of Hobbes, Locke, and succeeding liberals in which authority is derived
from individuals and the state ultimately is constrained to act to further
7. Sabine, State, XIV ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 328 (A. Johnson & E.
Seligman eds. 1938); Benn, State 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHmosoPHY 7-10 (1967).
8. See J. HARus, LAw AND LEGAL SCIENCE: AN INQUIRY INTO TE CONCEPTS "LEGAL
RULE" AND "LEGAL SYSTEM" (1979); H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEoRY OF LAW AND STATE (1945);
H. KELSEN, PURE THmoRY OF LAW (1967).
9. See Damaska, Activism in Perspective, 92 YALE L.J. 1189 (1983) (distinguishing
between "managerial" state and "reactive" state).
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individual ends or natural rights; 0 and finally, there is an economic deter-
minist or class struggle model which understands Western society to be
directed by a relatively monolithic government whose purpose is to maximize
the preconditions for growth of the capitalistic economy."
Among the state theorists, "regulation" tends to be shrunk conceptually
to agency-directed command and control direction of an industry. It also
tends to be intermittently dynamic.1 2 As the domestic and international
social, political, and economic landscape changes, so also must the policies
of the state evolve to meet new demands, if the state is to achieve its aims.
In the capitalist state model, government appears the handmaiden of eco-
nomic determinism, and regulation part of a larger, comprehensive mech-
anism beyond the reach of democratic political process.' 3 For social contract
theorists, in contrast, government regulation is always accountable to the
interests of the citizenry. Because of the lack of importance of sociological
detail in the workings of statist theories, the subjects of regulation are more
likely to be presented as definable targets susceptible to manipulation, rather
than as complex congeries of behaviors with ill-defined, changing boundaries
capable of adapting against attempted regulation.
State-centered writings also diverge sharply in the degree to which
particular social, political, or economic ends are prescribed, and what those
ends might be. For example, statist views sometimes underlie strongly
ideological writings of the right or left. Minimalists like Nozick prescribe a
world-which they currently do not see-based on voluntary associations
rather than the state.' 4 Capitalist state writers may be neutral, but if
prescriptive they may advocate radical reforms to break the hold of the
state on economic institutions.'
If current regulation is ineffective, the statist writer likely will advocate
that the regulation be made more explicit by closing loopholes, and tightened
by increasing penalties or prohibiting the exercise of discretion by those
charged with implementing the regulation.' 6 It would be inconsistent for a
10. This is sometimes referred to as the "public interest" or "public welfare" model.
See Benn, supra note 7, at 8-9; Mashaw & Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case
of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 268-69 (1987). See generally Mashaw,
"Rights" in the Federal Administrative State, 92 YALE L.J. 1129 (1983).
11. W. CONNOLLY, POLITICS AND AMBIGUITY (1987); C. NOBLE, LImERALsM AT WORK:
THE RISE AND FAmL OF OSHA (1986); K. PoANYx, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944); F.
THAYER, REBUIINo AMERICA: THE CASE FOR EcONOwc REoULATION (1984). It is difficult to
distinguish writers with this orientation from those who perceive in society a "radical plural-
ism," that is, one dominated by interest groups rather than by a monolithic state, but in
which the capitalist groups always prevail. Perrow, Foreword, in D. McCAFR1', supra note
4, at viii. No attempt is made to categorize the writers in these two groups.
12. The exception to this is the strongly positivistic juristic model, which has no
transcendent aims or intelligence, and hence is immune from environmental changes. See supra
note 8 and accompanying text.
13. D. MCCAPFREY, supra note 4, at 9-12.
14. R. NozicK, ANARcHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
15. See supra note 11.
16. E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, supra note 1, at 34-36, 54-56; Mashaw & Harfst, supra
note 10, at 268-69.
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statist to recognize that the failure of regulation might stem from a difficult
context in which the regulation is being implemented. The concept that an
external environment might control the workings of the regulation conflicts
with the statist hierarchical, top-down authority assumptions. The state is
always, in this view, capable of achieving its ends; if it is currently frustrated,
the fault must lie with an improperly worded law, or with sloppy admin-
istration.'
7
B. Regulation as Competition of Groups
If competing groups are made the focus of studies of economic regu-
lation, views emerge that differ from those of the statists concerning what
constitutes regulation, and how the subjects of regulation tend to react to
being controlled. A much milder image of the top-down authority hierarchy
underpins "groupist" theories. As part of this image, positions of authority
and dominance are indeed achieved, but the preeminence is impermanent
because subordinate groups constantly seek to undermine the authority and
position of the prevailing group." Precise control and direction from above
is therefore problematic, in contrast to the assumptions of the state theorists,
because the subjects of regulation sometimes are better served by resistance
or subterfuge. Because the sociological universe is expanded in these interest
group theories, the concept of "regulation" may grow to include influences
on economic behavior from sources other than the legislature and its
agencies. The context of regulatory efforts is consequently richer and more
complex, as economic actors are pulled simultaneously in many directions
by demands made by government, competing groups, and self-interest.
Much of the writing of the recent deregulatory movement emerges from
this pluralist perspective. "Business" interests are pitted against "regula-
tors," "environmentalists," "public interest groups," or unions, with each
group struggling to further its respective ends. The scholarly analysis using
this approach may be neutral, simply describing the course of the battles;
often, however, the study uses cost benefit analysis to assess regulatory
agency performance against a prescribed standard of wealth maximization.' 9
For group theorists, ineffective regulation implies that the regulated
actor is prevailing over whatever group or alliance of groups promulgated
the regulation. Strategically, the tide can be reversed by strengthening the
formal law, as in the statist scenario, or by weakening the opposition of
the regulated actor. Administrators of the relevant regulations might there-
17. E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, supra note 1, at 53-56; Damaska, supra note 9, at 1192
n.5.
18. This general statement must be qualified by noting such theories as C. WuGT
Mus, TEE POWER ELITE (1956), which recognize little mobility among the groups: what
appears to be social dynamism is merely the "circulation of elites." See also Perrow, supra
note 11.
19. See. e.g., S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITs REFORM (1982); P. MAcAvoy, TIM
REGULATED INDUSTRms AND TEm ECONOMY (1979); M. UTFON, THE EcONOMIcs OF REGULATING
INDusTRY (1986).
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fore seek broader, rather than weaker, discretion that could strengthen
compliance conditions and hence be used to intimidate the regulated actor
into a negotiated solution.
20
C. Regulation as Action by Individuals
The concern of studies of regulation that focus on individuals is not so
much with the substance of the regulation as with the motivations for its
creation and the ways in which regulation can be perversely or self-servingly
implemented. Typically these writings center on bureaucratic role behavior
within regulatory agencies2' or on evasive behavior by the regulated actors. 2
They also may focus on policymakers, describing legislative initiatives as
profoundly political events .23 From this perspective, the concept of regulation
begins to be swallowed up by the context in which regulation is implemented.
Directives may look impermanent and unpredictable due to discretionary
abandonment of enforcement, activist interpretation, corruption, or "cap-
ture." Formally, the target of regulatory effort is easily defined; yet as
regulation becomes a bargaining process involving company executives,
administrative officials, and elected officials, the entire network of indivi-
duals becomes in a real sense that which is "regulated."
Ineffective regulation would be explained by this group of writers as
the result of corruption or capture or job protection strategies. The solution
might be to make the regulatory administrators more secure and immune
from political pressures, thereby reducing the need for turf and job protec-
tion behaviors. Conversely, the solution might be to increase the account-
ability of the administrators by adding another layer of internal or independent
review of their behavior, or by decreasing the standards of official immunity
from private liability suits.
20. Cf. E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, supra note 1, at 37-39, 51-54.
21. See B. OWEN & R. BRAETniGsA, THE REGULATION GAmE: STRATEGIC USE OF THE
ADMINISTRATIvE PROCESS 18 (1978). Owen and Braeutigamn write that one way of thinking
about the process of regulation adopts
various 'rational actor' models, such as those of Peltzman, Noll and Fiorina, and
Niskanen. In these models rational regulators with well-defined objectives seek their
own ends. Generally, such models regard regulators as politicians seeking essentially
political rewards by use of the government's power to redistribute income. These
models tend to be cynical, or probably appear so to noneconomists.
Id.
22. See, e.g., Feldman & Zeckhauser, Some Sober Thoughts on Health Care Regulation,
in REoULATING Bus-mus, supra note 5, at 112-117 (discussing evasive behaviors and controls
exercised by health care providers over their would-be regulators).
23. See, e.g., M. DERTMCK & P. QUIRK, supra note 5, at 40-41 (suggesting that Senator
Edward M. Kennedy convened important regulatory reform hearings in 1975 as much to seek
consumerist voters as to improve industrial productivity or efficiency); S. TOLCHIN & M.
TOLCHN, DiSMANTLiNG AMERICA: THE RUSH TO DEREGULATE 114, 115 (chronicling President
Nixon's creation of Occupational Safety and Health Administration to curry favor with AFL-
CIO leader George Meany).
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D. Conclusions
Serious academic disagreement afflicts the concept of regulation, in-
cluding the mechanisms and ease of its implementation, and the scope of
the subject of regulation. For a general theory of regulation to perform its
ideal tasks, that is, identifying likely subjects of regulation, specifying the
regulatory techniques that might best be used to solve particular problems,
foreseeing costs and side effects, and assessing performance in meeting
regulatory goals, the preliminary assumptions about the meaning, purpose,
and effectiveness of regulation must be better integrated. It is at least very
difficult to conceive of regulation as simultaneously a defined set of written
rules, yet also a complex of behaviors influenced by a subtle and changing
environment;24 to consider the subjects of regulation as both a definable
industry or economic market, and also the personalities that happen to be
occupying key roles in the process of that regulation;2 to imagine that
regulation inevitably serves the ends of capitalism, and yet that its content
is constantly up for grabs among widely different groups, including anti-
capitalists;2 and to reconcile that while regulation is imposed with authority,
it also might never be effectively implemented. 27
The integration of these seeming contradictions may be accomplished;
certainly their reconciliation cannot be proved to be impossible. Given the
breadth of current disagreements about proper starting positions, however,
24. The same contradiction, between ideal law or rule and actual behavior, was described
by Hoebel in his efforts to comprehend law itself. He attempted to transcend the disjunction
methodologically, by focusing on disputes or "trouble cases." E. A. HOEBEL, THE LAW OF
PiusmrvE MAN 29-37 (1983). Developing a general theory of regulation, however, is more
ambitious than Hoebel's efforts. Because it would attempt to create a framework that will
predict and commend as well as elucidate, merely focusing research efforts on judicial review
of administrative decisions will not suffice.
25. Thomas Schelling provides insights on why, for example, the actions of a group or
business provide an unreliable guide to the motivations of the individuals constituting the
group:
A bunch of timid people directing an enterprise do not necessarily make for a
"timid" enterprise; everybody may lack the personal boldness to oppose a rash
action. "Responsible" individuals may be so loyal to the organization that they
acquiesce in policies that appear "irresponsible." Responsibility may be so diluted
within an enterprise that there is no one to blame when the organization seems
blameworthy, no individual to reward when the organization behaves uncommonly
well.... To expect an organization to reflect the qualities of the individuals who
work for it or to impute to the individuals the qualities one sees in the organization
is to commit what logicians call the "fallacy of composition."
Schelling, Command and Control, in SOCIAL REsPON5sIArrY AND THE BusINEss PREDICAMENT,
supra note 6, at 83-84.
26. The radical pluralist position that group competition persists while the long-range
interests of capitalism are inevitably served does not truly reconcile this tension: it merely
subordinates the behavioral aspect to the ideological. Se supra note 11 and accompanying
text.
27. Realistically, however, the pattern of authoritative regulation plus nonimplementation
or counterproductive side-effects is common, if not the norm. See Schelling, supra note 25,
at 79-80; cf. S. FAuK-MooRn, LAW As PRocEss: AN ANTHROPOLOaiCAL APPROACH 54-81 (1978).
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a valid and acceptable general theory of regulation remains elusive. Its
form, if ever a general theory is developed, would most likely describe a
complex network of interacting factors that at times are mutually supportive,
and at other times suppress one another. The importance of the context in
which regulation proceeds-that is, the breadth or narrowness of the mean-
ing of regulation-will expand and contract over time, and as the investi-
gation moves among different regulatory problems. Moreover, no single
level of society-state, groups, or individuals-will be preeminent, or always
preeminent. The antagonism of focus that characterizes much regulatory
study might be reconciled, therefore, in a framework that recognizes and
legitimates the competing pressures at each level. The beginnings of such
an approach will be sketched in part III below.
III. FiRwoRK FOR A GENERAL THEORY
A successful general theory of regulation hence suggests an image of
dynamic, conflicting factors that are never conceptually integrated, but
instead jostle one another constantly. Rath.- than assume that all regulation
is of the formally conceived, deliberative sort that originates from legisla-
tures, a variety of alternative regulatory mechanisms would be described.
Particular regulatory instances would be "governed" by combinations of
various influences, the components of which would shift constantly in
strength and direction. Most importantly, the regulatory system must evolve
according to its own dynamics, based on inevitable internal conflicts and
adjustments.
A. Attributes of Major Alternative Decisional Mechanisms
The alternative decisional mechanisms are best categorized by the various
tools or methods they might employ. Economic activity can be strongly
influenced by any of the following methods: command and control; free
market; broad market-affecting legislation like taxes, subsidies, quotas, or
general policing provisions like the antitrust laws; transferable regulatory
credits; and private litigation based on common-law rights. Each of these
methods has different attributes, and each method is better suited, and less
well suited, to resolving certain kinds of problems.
The diverse attributes of the various decisional methods are revealed in
the respective responses to the following questions: What is the nature and
quality of information required to make a decision using this tool?2 How
much participation, and of what sort, do nondeciders have in the decisional
process? Are decisions made locally, or centrally? Can the tool be brought
to- bear comprehensively, or only in a piecemeal fashion, with the enter-
28. See generally Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive
Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARv. L. REv. 547 (1979); Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory
Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms,
37 SrA. L. REv. 1267 (1985).
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prise?29 Does this tool seek precise outcomes, or merely create boundaries
within which much variability is expected? Will the decisions made in one
instance "spread" by analogy to other instances? What opportunities does
the device afford for manipulation or strategic behavior by the regulated
actor? Does this tool rely on state-backed coercion to implement decisions,
or does it somehow harness individual self-interest to be self-executing? If
individual self-interest, how much coordination among the individuals is
required to implement the solution?
Fitting these attributes to the various decisional mechanisms produces
the following general descriptions.
1. Command and Control
Command and control techniques30 are the most ambitious, and the
most difficult to implement, of all the devices to influence economic
enterprise. Knowledge of the entire enterprise is required to accomplish the
regulatory purpose, which is to deal comprehensively with the problem by
carefully managing all the contingencies. 3 Command and control methods
attempt to eliminate or direct all other influences, which means that much
29. See Kahn, The Theory and Application of Regulation, 55 ANTrrRusT L.J. 177, 178-
81 (1986). See generally Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HAIv. L.
REv. 393 (1981).
30. This term has been used in different ways. Latin, for example, defines command
and control as regulation of specific conduct and notes it "is usually contrasted with economic
incentive systems that use price mechanisms to encourage regulated parties to attain desired
goals." Latin, supra note 28, at 1267 n.2. He then describes command and control techniques
as employing uniform standards across a given industry. In contrast, I distinguish command
and control techniques not only from transferable incentive systems, see infra notes 52-56 and
accompanying text, but also from any penalty or reward-based system that uses more general,
uniform standards, see infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. Command and control is
thus more particularized, tailored, and comprehensive regulation of an industry and its
components, or of a problem like attaining clean water. See also Ackerman & Stewart,
Reforming Environmental Law, 37 ST. L. REv. 1333, 1334 (1985).
31. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 30, at 1336-37. As one commentator described the
factors inhibiting the effectiveness of OSHA's command and control efforts:
Quite simply, OSHA's enforcement effort is too modest to create truly effective
financial incentives for safety.
Even if these incentives were strong, not all risks could be eliminated. Many
accidents stem from aspects of the work process other than the specific technological
characteristics regulated by OSHA. That most workplace risks have not been readily
amenable to the influence of OSHA regulations is in stark contrast to the optimistic
projections of the framers of OSHA's legislative mandate, who anticipated a 50
percent drop in workplace risks.
The chief contributing factor relates to worker actions. Although the estimates
of the role of the worker in causing accidents vary, in part because of the difficulty
in assigning accidents caused jointly by worker actions and technological deficiencies,
it is clear that worker actions play a substantial role.
Viscusi, Reforming OSHA Regulation of Workplace Risks, in REGULATORY REFoaM: WHAT
AcT ALLY HAPI-PENE 259-60 (L. Weiss & M. Klass eds. 1986) [hereinafter REGuLAToRY
REFoRM].
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of the context in which an industry operates must also be monitored to
create a sort of buffer that protects the integrity of the commands running
the actual enterprise.2 Such all-encompassing direction may stifle market
and social innovation.
33
Command and control techniques are usually centrally operated with
formal but limited participation by outsiders, and rely on coercion for
implementation. 34 Very precise outcomes are sought, but since regulations
are inherently less subtle than their factual settings, side effects often arise.
35
Command and control methods work best where the context in which
an enterprise operates is relatively simple, or where the regulatory goals are
so vital that the context can be changed, forcibly if necessary, to accomplish
those goals. Unless most persons affected by the regulation share its pur-
poses, however, command and control is distinctly vulnerable to sabotage
or manipulation by the regulated actors toward methods that emphasize
self-interest rather than coercion. 6 On the other hand, because of their
particularity, command and control decisions tend not to spread by analogy.
2. Free Market
The attributes of the free market contrast strongly with those of
command and control techniques. The market adopts a radically decentral-
ized, participatory, and piecemeal approach that can contain all shades of
inconsistency. Far from attempting to craft precise outcomes, no particular
outcome is contemplated by the market. Total knowledge of the enterprise
context is desirable even in making market decisions, but the self-correcting
32. See, e.g., T. McCRAw, PRoPHms OF REGULATION: CuARLEs FRAlcis Amms, Louis
D. BRANrois, JAMEs M. LANDis, AiFRED E. KAm4 263-64 (1984) (route allocation process of
Civil Aeronautics Board inevitably required regulation of many other aspects of airline
operation, even trivial matters). This need to control minutiae had side effects: it precluded
the CAB from formulating an overall regulatory strategy, and ultimately forced agency actions
to adopt adjudicatory procedures to mask the comprehensiveness and arbitrariness of its
decisions.
Alfred Kahn made a similar point:
Control price, and the result will be artificial stimulus to entry. Control entry as
well, and the results will be an artificial stimulus to compete by offering commissions
to travel agents, advertising, scheduling, free meals, and bigger seats. The response
of the complete regulator, then, is to limit advertising, control scheduling and travel
agents' commissions, specify the size of the sandwiches and seats and the charge for
inflight movies. Each time the dyke [sic] springs a leak, plug it with one of your
fingers; just as a dynamic industry will perpetually find ways of opening new holes
in the dyke, so an ingenious regulator will never run out of regulatory fingers.
Interview with Alfred Kahn, id. at 272.
33. See Interview with Alfred Kahn, supra note 32. See generally Stewart, Regulation,
Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CAwIF. L. REv. 1256 (1981).
34. Stewart, supra note 33, at 1273-77.
35. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 30, at 1335-36.
36. Feldman & Zeckhauser, supra note 22, at 114.
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mechanisms are so strong that partial knowledge or even total ignorance in
some decisionmaking is tolerated (although someone likely will be harmed
through the bad decision made). Solutions depend on self-interest rather
than coercion, although sometimes severe coordination diffiqulties like the
familiar free-rider and moral hazard problems impede implementation.
Market solutions work best for industries engaged in complex distribution
of goods or services, or where the political or economic context is unsettled.
Because market solutions are voluntary and each individual decision is so
particularized, the decisions tend not to spread.
The contrasts between the first two possible regulatory techniques, that
is, command and control versus the free market, are well illustrated by the
airline industry's dramatic shift over the past decade from heavy reliance
on command and control techniques to strong market regulation. From
their respective descriptions above, one might predict that the regulatory
shift toward a heavier influence of the market would be successful. As
noted in greater detail below, however, certain consequences that have
accompanied the system shift were not predicted, and some of those are
counterproductive to the original aims of deregulation. This brief case study
demonstrates the complexity of regulatory issues and should serve to warn
against embracing simple regulatory design theories.
Executive control of the airlines through the Civil Aeronautics Board
was withdrawn in an effort to improve airline productivity and lower airfares
for consumers.17 Market influences thereby increased enormously, and were
substantially complementary to the purposes of the deregulation: many fares
dropped, and flight seating was fuller.38 However, unwanted (though not
wholly unanticipated) operational and financial side-effects of the system
shift also were felt.39 Operationally, some relatively unpopulated areas
suffered fare increases 4° or deterioration of service. 4' Overuse of "hub and
37. P. MAcAvoy, supra note 19, at 112. As one commentator summarized:
It was widely accepted prior to 1978 that regulation had led to inefficiency in the
[airline] industry and an unduly rigid industrial structure which did not properly
cater for the changing pattern of consumer demands. De-regulation was expected to
go a long way to remove the sources of inefficiency and to promote a more adaptable
industry. According to a number of analyses that have been made of the industry
since de-regulation, these predictions have, to a considerable extent, been proved
correct although the transition has not been without its difficulties, some of which
are still unresolved.
M. UTToN, supra note 19, at 199.
38. See, e.g., S. MoRRISON & C. WINSTON, Tan EcoNoIc EFFEcTs OF AIRLINE DEREG-
TLATioN 13-36 (1986); A. SAMPsoN, EMPIRs OF THE SKY: THE PoLITICs, CONTESTS, AND
CARTELS OF Woaw AIRLINES 140 (1985); F. THAYER, supra note 11, at 77; M. UTrON, supra
note 19, at 200; Kaplan, The Changing Airline Industry, in REGuLATORY REFoRM, supra note
31, at 51.
39. A. M cus, THE ADvERsARY EcoNomy: Busmmss RESPONSES TO CHANGING GovRN-
MENT REQuEMENTS 118-19 (1984); F. THAYER, supra note 11, at 78-87.
40. A. SAMPSoN, supra note 38, at 141; F. THAYER, supra note 11, at 80-81.
41. T. McCRAw, supra note 32, at 298; A. SAMPSON, supra note 38, at 141; see also S.
MORusoN & C. WINsTON, supra note 38, at 47-50. Concern about this effect was voiced
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spoke" routing may have caused inefficiencies in fuel use and greater risks
associated with more frequent than necessary takeoffs and landings.4 2 More-
over, routine maintenance schedules have lengthened, and pilot experience
lessened, raising additional safety concerns.4 3 Some commentators foresee a
precarious fianacial position for the industry, manifested in airline bank-
ruptcies and takeovers.44 Others worry about the growing market concen-
tration of merged airlines and the barriers to entry represented by their
ability to dominate scarce airport docking berths45 and computerized reser-
vation systems, although this latter barrier was softened in a late CAB
official action."
As important as this enhanced market influence and related side effects
may be, they do not exhaust the decisional system shifts that followed CAB
withdrawal. The Federal Aviation Administration and Department of Trans-
portation have increased their vigilance, edging over into issues that previ-
ously would have been the concern of the CAB. 47 The most visible of these
is the recent requirement that airlines publish monthly records of their
timeliness in meeting departure and arrival schedules.
48
Airline deregulation may well prove a successful effort to produce
particular effects, in this case better productivity and service, by deliberately
reconstituting an industry's regulatory mix. Most evidence suggests an
outcome more or less as planned. 49 Yet even ten years after the major
deregulatory decisions, the results are not fully assured. The industry remains
in turmoil, with side effects only gradually being revealed.
3. Broad Legislation
Boundary-setting legislation that contains or confines economic enter-
prise through general restrictions or quotas, or that guides it in a particular
direction through taxes or subsidies, shares several attributes with the
throughout the deregulation process, and Chairman Kahn attempted to meet it through vigorous
application of microeconomic theory. T. McCs~w, supra note 32, at 290-92. Nevertheless, at
the time the Airline Deregulation Act was passed Congress appended the Essential Air Service
Program, which subsidized, but also required, service to continue to the small communities
listed in carriers' certificates in 1978. S. MoRauSON & C. WINsTON, supra note 38, at 67-68;
Kaplan, supra note 38, at 67-68.
42. F. THAYER, supra note 11, at 81.
43. Id. at 84-87; A. SAMPSON, supra note 38, at 143-44. But see Kaplan, supra note 38,
at 70.
44. F. THAYm, supra note 11, at 78; see also A. SAMPSON, supra note 38, at 138-40.
But see S. MORRISON & C. WINSTON, supra note 38, at 36-41, 73.
45. Kaplan, supra note 38, at 68-69.
46. M. UTroN, supra note 19, at 200-02; see also S. MoRRISON & C. WINSTON, supra
note 38, at 68-71; Kaplan, supra note 38, at 65-66.
47. Miller, The Administration's Role in Deregulation, 55 ANTITRUsT L.J. 199, 203
(1986).
48. Department of Transportation, Airline Service Quality Performance, 14 C.F.R. §§
234, 255 (1988).
49. M. UToTN, supra note 19, at 202; supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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command and control technique. 0 It is centrally created or directed, usually
with limited participation by nondecisionmakers, and it is coercively en-
forced. Like command and control, it most often operates industry-wide,
although the scope of some legislation, like that of the antitrust laws or
general business taxes, is far more general. Unlike command and control,
this form of regulation does not seek outcome precision. On the contrary,
it permits wide latitude in industry activity by merely monitoring the
boundaries it sets,-" or providing incentives or subsidies toward some goal.
Because it announces broad policy of the government, the influence of the
penal type of this form of regulation may spread beyond its formal appli-
cation. It usually does not address problems piecemeal or within local
context, but rather adopts a particular style of affecting an entire industry
uniformly. Because of its relative inattention to context, unintended side
effects may accompany its use, as where subsidies inhibit innovation and
productivity, or import quotas contribute to price inflation. Boundary or
guidance legislation is best used to address particular problems or patterns
that recur across many different industries. It is also a relatively good
technique where little is known about context, where information generally
is difficult to obtain, or where diversity of regulated actor behavior is
desirable.
4. Transferable Regulatory Credits
Transferable credit devices harness self-interest to achieve regulatory
purposes.5 2 A general policy goal is centrally set, not necessarily with much
participation by nondecisionmakers. The primary goal is accomplished,
however, only with the substantial participation of the regulated actors, and
therefore is probably less assured than where control and command methods
are used.53 The actors earn credits for compliance with a regulatory policy
goal like reduction of industrial discharge of polluting substances, which
credits can then be sold or otherwise transferred to other regulated actors.
The overall policy goal is met, but not by imposing uniform behavioral
requirements on the actors. In theory, this form of regulation is more
efficient than command and control because compliance will be attained by
some actors (those for whom the required behavior is cheapest) doing a
great deal more than the average amount of the behavior.5 4 Actors for
whom performing the behavior would be very expensive comply by pur-
chasing credits from the "overachievers." A more traditional variation of
50. See generally Breyer, supra note 28, at 578-82 (discussing antitrust laws, disclosure
regulations, and taxes).
51. Id. at 580-81.
52. See generally B. ACKERMAN, S. ROsE-AcKERMAN, J. SAWYER & D. HENDERSON, THE
UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QuA=rrY 260-75 (1974); S. BREYER, supra note 19, at
171-74; Breyer, supra note 28, at 582; Stewart, supra note 33, at 1332-37, 1373-74.
53. Stewart, supra note 33, at 1326, 1328-30, 1334-37.
54. Id. at 1264.
ECONOMIC REGULATION
transferable regulatory credits is a coupon system of rationing in which a
predesignated amount of consumption is permitted through distribution,
perhaps for a fee, of coupons or tokens.5 5 If the coupons are transferable,
theoretically the rationing system will be more efficient, because those
persons with a higher preference for the rationed substance will purchase
coupons from persons who value the item less.
Besides its easier implementation through self-interest rather than co-
ercion,- the transferable regulatory credits system has the advantage of
requiring relatively less knowledge on the part of the policymaking authority.
It is best suited to regulate where nonstandardized treatment among various
actors is required. This might be the case, for example, where the severity
of the problem is related to context, and that context is subtle or complex;
or where factors external but significant to the problem (like politics, for
example) change constantly.
5. Private Litigation
Like the marketplace, common-law litigation inherently constitutes a
more piecemeal, rather than comprehensive, form of regulation.', Moreover,
litigation operates more locally than centrally, and it is therefore quite
context sensitive.58 Litigation requires more comprehensive knowledge about
a problem to make an effective decision than does the atomized free
market,5 9 however, and regulation through litigation is basically coercive
rather than implemented through self-interest. Although each particular
lawsuit decision results in a precise outcome, the common law as a whole
aggregates varying decisions, thus reducing precision levels below those of
some other regulatory methods.6 Moreover, costs and practical problems
like injury latency and problematic causation inherent to many regulatory
contexts limit the usefulness of litigation as a regulatory device.
6'
The effects of litigation often spread by analogy to related settings,
without need of organized coordination. What amounts to new regulation
55. Id. at 1326-32.
56. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 30, at 1342-46. But see Fix & Eads, The Prospects
for Regulatory Reform: The Legacy of Reagan's First Term, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 305-08
(1985); Weiss, Social Regulation of Business Activity: Reforming the Corporate Governance
System to Resolve an Institutional Impasse, 28 UCLA L. REv. 343, 408-09 (1981).
57. Bardach & Kagan, Liability Law and Social Regulation, in SociAL. REGuLATimN:
STRATEGIES FOR REFoRm 239 (1982). "Courts impose liability only for behavior that actually
has caused harm, not for behavior that might cause it. The adjudicatory process and private
negotiations that accompany it tend to elicit evidence and focus attention on the risks and
equities in each specific case." Id.
58. "[L]iability standards applied by the courts usually are more generally worded and
open ended (and hence, more sensitive to the particular context) than the detailed specification
standards enforced by regulatory agencies." Id. at 239; see also id. at 249.
59. See Harter & Eads, Policy Instruments, Institutions, and Objectives: An Analytical
Framework for Assessing "'Alternatives" to Regulation, 37 ADmN. L. REv. 221, 248 (1985).
60. Breyer, supra note 28, at 583.
61. See Stewart, supra note 33, at 1337, and sources cited therein.
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is achieved by self-restraint or the enacting of prophylactic measures.6 2 Such
spreading in a given instance may or may not be appropriate. Where
inappropriate, the resulting behavior is an unintended side effect of the
litigation. One example of this would be the commonly described problem
of practicing overly defensive medicine in response to medical malpractice
litigation.
Litigation is a particularly appropriate regulator of economic activity
where coupled with a strong influence from the free market. In such settings,
the legal outcomes are said to correct whatever defects exist in the market
due to free rider or externality problems. Private litigation also can be a
useful adjunct in implementing boundary legislation like the antitrust or
employment discrimination laws.
B. Structural Considerations
The difficulty in designing good regulation is that the normal approaches
are either simplistic, or unrealistic. The simplistic approach attempts to
choose the most appropriate regulatory tool for the particular problem at
hand. Although that sort of thinking reflects conceptual progress, the issues
and factual contexts surrounding regulation are simply too subtle for any
single regulatory device to be effective. By contrast, any theory that presumes
to mix the use of regulatory techniques in different degrees, as though one
were designing a stew to taste a particular way, overestimates our ability to
predict the ways in which law, group interests and politics, and administra-
tive behaviors all interact.
A regulatory design that attempts to be subtle yet realistic starts with
a recognition and description of the various influences on economic behav-
ior. It then fashions a system in which many of those influences come into
62. Bardach & Kagan, supra note 57, at 238:
The mere threat of such lawsuits [for injuries and illnesses caused by dangerous
products or pollutants] ... would seem to provide strong incentives for enterprises
to control any aspect of their activities that might lead to damage claims, even if
the protective measures needed to avoid liability are not mandated by direct regu-
lations....
The behavioral effects of spreading can be equivalent, or perhaps even superior, to direct
regulation. Bardach and Kagan continue with their example:
Where the threat of such damage suits is present, enterprises establish their own
safety staffs and quality control units to conduct intensive internal inspections, or
they submit to inspections by the loss control representatives dispatched by liability
insurance companies. These private inspectors are present more often than govern-
ment inspectors and are more knowledgeable about specific risks posed by each
facility. Also, largely because they are free of the legal constraints and accountability
pressures under which their government counterparts operate, private inspectors can
tailor protective standards more closely to the hazards presented by the particular
enterprise and thus minimize unreasonableness.
Id. at 239.
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play at different levels, in ways that predictably conflict.6 Rather than
design a system that is unified or harmonious, in other words, the better
system is one in which mutually exclusive influences buffer each other,
accommodate themselves to one another, and cause each other to change
to meet environmental demands. 64 Truly effective regulatory systems are to
a degree beyond human imagination; the complexity and required flexibility
of response cannot be fully engineered. We must settle for erecting insti-
tutions that can then constantly build themselves. This image should not be
revolutionary: it is simply applying to the design of laws those same
principles of institutional checks and balances we readily accept in our
political system." The concepts of separation of powers and federalism are
ways in which cross-cutting influences at the level of state, group, and
individual are created, but not consciously managed. 66 Ironically, although
the process writ large of our government is visible, its precise interactions
on any question are unfathomable. Yet the outcome of any particular
problem is not wholly unpredictable; the substance of government decisions
generally lies within a fairly narrow band of broadly consensual values as
more radical proposals weaken the effects of one another.67
The effective regulatory system works similarly. Each level should be
equipped with a number of different tools or powers, which can be strong
and should be conflicting. Within limits it may not then matter if, for
example, at the state level the law purporting to govern economic behavior
is written in a blunt, unequivocal, even foolish manner. Even the most
direct law can be softened if the various affected groups have access within
the larger system in which the law is administered, as where the regulated
actor controls much of the technical information and expertise on which
the administrators depend 6" or where administrative rulemaking procedures
63. S. BREYER, supra note 19, Harter & Eads, supra note 59, and Stewart, supra note
33 each offer useful frameworks that recognize the mutual influences of the various alternative
regulatory techniques. None of the three, however, embrace the conflicts among the techniques
and none is as skeptical as this Essay about the efficacy of human engineering. Although not
offering a general theory, Yellin, Science, Technology, and Administrative Government:
Institutional Designs for Environmental Decisionmaking, 92 YALE L.J. 1300, 1329-30 (1983)
and Carter, Separation and Skepticism, 92 YALE L.J. 1334 (1983) stress a conflict-based
approach for regulatory settings.
64. The envisioned system closely resembles the "incrementalist" model (as contrasted
with the "comprehensive rationality" model) developed by Charles Lindblom and described
by Professor Diver, supra note 29, at 399-401. Diver makes intelligent recommendations about
when one paradigm is preferable to the other, and when the transition from one to the other
should be made. The system described in this Essay differs from Diver's incrementalist model
in that it is much broader in scope, accepting as functioning components more than Diver
suggests. Also, I do not accept a clear dichotomy between incrementalism and comprehensive
rationality; I view the latter as unrealistic in any social context.
65. Yellin, supra note 63, at 1322.
66. Id.
67. See M. DERTmcK & P. QuirK, supra note 5, at 256-57.
68. D. McCAsr-y, supra note 4, at 40 discusses, for example, some major controls
exercisable by OSHA-regulated businesses:
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include hearings open to the public. The blunt law further can be buffered
where administrators have discretion over interpretation or enforcement, 69
although safeguards against corruption must then also be strengthened.
Good regulatory design thus follows certain principles:
1. Do not overspecify the content of regulation by seeking total inte-
gration or consistency; let internal conflicts transform the system from a
static one to a dynamic one.70
2. Build in ways for regulatory mechanisms to shift in the strength of
their influence. This is one of the most difficult goals to achieve, but also
one of the most vital. Network linkages must be created to draw in
participation from alternative regulatory mechanisms. Requirements of pub-
lic hearings in rulemaking serve this function, as would enhanced agency
"services" such as those recommended for OSHA: more complaint inspec-
tions, worker training programs, and "information oriented" regulations. 7
Include a role for the state through an initial law; include a role for politics
through the budget and appointment process 72 or through institutions that
regularly require participation by the public and the media;73 and include a
What are the pressures business can bring to bear against [chemical regulation]?
First, business controls employment. If workers believe that cleaning up work-
place conditions will cost them their jobs, they will probably not support chemical
control until their lives or abilities are clearly, imminently in danger. Second, business
controls the bulk of scientific, technical, and legal resources in occupational health
work. This means that businesses overwhelmingly influence what information is
released to workers and the public and what issues are pushed hardest in regulatory
proceedings.
69. See Scalia, The Role of the Judiciary in Deregulation, 55 ANrmusT L.J. 191, 195-
98 (1986).
70. P. MAcAvoy, supra note 19, at 28, 87. MacAvoy describes the extreme detail of
equipment specifications, rather than performance standards, that came to dominate OSHA
rules. Because it became so difficult to generate new standards, some areas of industrial
production were governed in minute detail, while other areas were neglected. This in turn led
to uneven treatment among firms.
Such overdesign by too much detailed specification ironically also creates a chronic
underdesign. Because the OSHA regulations were so comprehensive in what they did do,
workers had no participatory role in ensuring their own safety conditions, leading to the
conclusion that
the OSH Act left the existing organization of work and industrial relations essentially
untouched and grafted state power onto that system. Managers remained in charge
of the labor process; workers remained subordinate to them, shut out of the most
important decisions about working conditions. Occupational safety and health re-
mained a by-product of market-based investment decisions. The incentives to em-
ployers to undersupply occupational safety and health, and the disincentives to
employees to participate in decisions about the conditions of work, remained in
place.
C. Noaah, supra note 11 at 98; see also D. McCAxFREY, supra note 4, at 40 (citing case of
worker's compensation schemes and withering of common law tort recovery for worker injury
to warn against regulation that displaces other useful regulatory mechanisms).
71. D. McCAF"pnY, supra note 4, at 156-57.
72. Cf. S. TOLCHN & M. ToLcmN, supra note 23, at 22, 93 (criticizing Reagan
Administration budgetary cutbacks at EPA and OSHA).
73. Yellin, supra note 63, at 1323-24, 1328-29.
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role for individual administrative discretion through general language or
standards in the regulations that must be interpreted.7 4 Monitor against
corruption or abuse of administrative discretion through judicial review75 or
facilitating private causes of action.
3. Different regulatory techniques require different sorts of information,
or different quantities of information, to be effective.7 6 Include in every
regulatory system ways for every different sort of information to make an
impact.
77
4. Build in ways for the implementation of controls to be atomized and
decentralized: 7 generally, the smaller each decision, the lesser the conse-
quences of error. The more frequent the decisions, the more responsive to
change in the environment. The more local the decisions, the more sensitive
to nuances of context.
The focus of this part III is not efficiency, which is the prevailing
concern of microeconomic analysis. Rather, the evaluative concept in the
systemic perspective is "effectiveness" in designing an appropriate and
dynamic mix of regulatory mechanisms to deal with a given problem or
industry. Because the framework offered above is sketchy and preliminary,
no conclusions can be made about its efficacy. The desirability of working
towards its development, however, can be addressed by shifting finally to
the cultural perspective.
IV. CONCLUSION: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF ECONOMIC REGULATION
In concluding an Essay that offers only a little room for optimism
about achieving substantial improvement in regulatory design, it is fitting
to explore briefly what is at stake. The cultural implications of our regulatory
efforts are revealed through such evaluative concepts as fairness, human
dignity, self-determination, and political stability.
74. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. If regulatory language is so strict or
detailed as to preclude such discretion, the regulated actors are more likely to perceive the
administrative process as "unreasonable." E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, supra note 1, at 71-77.
75. See generally Mashaw, supra note 10; Rabin, Legitimacy, Discretion, and the Concept
of Rights, 92 YALE L.J. 1174 (1983); Scalia, supra note 69, at 191-98; Thomas, Wildemann,
& Brown, The Courts and Agency Deregulation: Limitations on the Presidential Control of
Regulatory Policy, 39 ADxw. L. REv. 27 (1987).
76. Harter & Eads, supra note 59, at 248-49, 251-57. See generally Yellin, supra note
63.
77. If information is bottled up by regulatory agencies, or required to be supplied only
in a constricted format, worker participation in safety enforcement may be impaired, D.
McCAyRpay, supra note 4, at 45-53; C. NOBLE, supra note 11, at 26-27, or industry innovation
may be stifled, Boies, Deregulation in Practice, 55 ANTrrRUST L.J. 185, 187-88 (1986).
78. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 30, at 1355-59; Stewart, supra note 33, at 1359-
61. Professor Stewart does maintain, however, that a centralized rather than decentralized
administrative process is more easily policed by citizen groups, unions, and lobbyists. Stewart,
supra note 33, at 1265; see also Huber, Electricity and the Environment: In Search of Regulatory
Authority, 100 HAuv. L. REv. 1002 (1987), who argues in favor of centralized, unified
regulation of electricity supply. Huber's article squarely opposes the uncoordinated, pluralistic
vision of regulatory systems suggested in this Essay.
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To speak of the cultural impacts of economic deregulation and rere-
gulation is to step to a significantly higher level of abstraction than is
addressed by either the microeconomic or systemic perspectives. The mood
of the cultural dimension is best captured by questions like the following:
What are the purposes of economic regulation? Is there some value to
preserving the public or common ownership feeling that attaches to industries
regulated through command and control techniques? 79 Is it wise to depend
solely on market techniques of allocation, regardless of suddenness in
distributional shifts? 0 In its interactions with the public, does a traditionally
regulated industry communicate different messages about human worth or
equality than those communicated by market-led enterprises?8' Should hu-
man goals themselves be regarded as commodities, to be tested for their
worth in the marketplace?
2
The questions are being slowly, and to date obliquely, addressed by
modem administrative law. The progress is best seen in the "fundamental
tensions" described by Professor Sunstein: first, the courts are encouraging
a pluralistic rationality "by ensuring representation of all affected interests" 3
in the decisionmaking. This reflects judgment by the courts that regulation
is not purely, or perhaps even primarily, economic; rather, it is social. 84 In
conflict with that participatory ethic, says Sunstein, is a desire that agency
decisions should not be merely a response to private interests equipped with
preexisting preferences. They should instead be an attempt to decide upon
and implement the public values at stake in regulatory choices. 5 This policy
recognizes that even economic decisions emerge from a cultural context that
is collectively created, and that can be collectively affected. The ends of
79. As stated in Chickering, supra note 5, at 226:
Although their general commitments are very different, the commitment to smallness
that binds the old regulation and the new may highlight the competing social value
which regulation often serves in preference to efficiency. The issue of smallness
recalls the problems of lost community, and of declining social trust that depends
on close personal relationships and contact.
80. B. OWEN & R. BRA uTiGAM, supra note 21, at 1, 22-24, 35.
81. Chickering, supra note 5, at 26-27.
82. Cf. W. CONNOLLY, supra note 11, at 23, 30.
83. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 Sup. CT. Rav. 177, 183.
84. According to Weaver:
The real purpose of governmental regulation is not to correct the deficiencies of
markets, but to transcend markets altogether-which is to say, government regulation
is not an economic policy, but social policy. It is an effort to advance a conception
of the public interest apart from, and often opposed to, the outcomes of the
marketplace and, indeed, the entire idea of a market economy. (That is why
economists of all political views end up being so critical of government regulation,
at least as it works out in practice. They think regulatory policy should make sense
economically-which, of course, it never quite does.
Weaver, Regulation, Social Policy, and Class Conflict, in REGUnATIG BusnEss, supra note
5, at 193, 208; see also B. OwENs & R. BRAEuTiGAm, supra note 21, at 1-2, 22-25, 35; infra
note 93 and accompanying text.
85. Sunstein, supra note 83, at 188, 213.
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both pluralism and commonality are laudable, and so also is the continuing
tension and consequent struggle between them. Implementing public values
without a strong mechanism for their debate and modification is dangerous,
but aggregating preferences without cultural reference can end in nihilism.
We seem to have arrived at a watershed regarding the relative influence
of public and private control of economic enterprises, a time when the
successes and failures of both welfare liberalism and supply side conservatism
are accessible even to relatively young memories. 6 The issues are complex
and imply solutions that may conflict at different levels of abstraction. So,
for example, one might accept that efficiency is enhanced by the return of
a given industry to market regulation rather than by its continuation with
government regulation. This solution might even be confirmed at a systemic
level, where the side effects of the existing regulatory technique are glaringly
revealed and the marketplace is predictably the most efficacious regulatory
mechanism among the several available. And yet the issue should not be
considered concluded.Y We would have resolved the issues made compre-
hensible by "what profits us?" and "what works best?" but not the issues
suggested by "what do we want for ourselves and our culture?" This latter
question, although arguably central to our relationships with each other and
our physical environment, is rarely discussed.
Yet the issue is neither marginal nor impractical. Culture can indeed be
affected by our collective responses when the question of human direction
is raised and followed by serious .dialogue. The successes of the civil rights
movement and feminism, for example, are evidence that political culture
can be reshaped significantly within a single generation. Why then should
economic culture be regarded as immune to conscious human efforts to
change it?"s Why do we so assiduously avoid even raising the question?89
Perhaps because our models of the alternatives are so impoverished, swung
back and forth by rhetoric about freedom and greed.90 Or perhaps out of
frustration, because we feel that while political issues are within human
grasp, economic conditions are beyond it. Ironically, laissez-faire and Marx-
86. Id. at 19-20; see S. ToLcON & M. ToLcmN, supra note 23, at 15. See generally
Weaver, supra note 84.
87. See generally Weaver, supra note 84.
88. According to McCraw, however, regulation that disrespects the market most often
has failed in its objectives, whereas regulation that works in conjunction with the market has
succeeded. This suggests that successful regulation in the future should strive to reconcile all
three of the vocabularies of the paper. T. McCRAw, supra note 32, at 308-09.
89. For a thoughtful exception to this general avoidance, see Weiss, supra note 56.
90. C. NOBLE, supra note 11, at 241:
As a rule, Americans are trapped in a dichotomous way of thinking about the
political economy that counterposes the state and the market and fails to consider
the complex relationships between them. As a result, Americans swing back and
forth between bouts of enthusiasm for state intervention and moods of deep distrust
of all forms of public life-leaning first to 'big government' and then to the 'free
market.' It is commonplace to point out that neither image is accurate.
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ist economists share a bedrock belief in economic determinism, be the
causative hand invisible or on the controls of the means of production. 91
If economic determinism is rejected, then the dialogue about public and
private control of economic enterprise is free to include questions about
equality, both distributional and spiritual; 92 it can include questions about
whether people should be regarded by the due process rights they hold, or
rather by the wealth or social status they possess; 93 and it can include
questions about the accessibility of information to create meaningful dia-
logue.94 In the choices that emerge from such dialogue, the antagonism
between neutral and prescriptive approaches to regulation is muted, and
ultimately not very useful. Regulatory rationality should transcend both the
outcomes of cost benefit studies and the simple counting of preferences. 9
The same broad rationality should accompany efforts to design general
theories of regulation.
91. Perhaps the prominence of economists in regulatory policymaking will fade. Looking
at their role from a historical perspective, McCraw concludes:
[T]he 'economist's hour' of the 1970s and 1980s ... represents a phenomenon of
unpredictable duration. Certainly the economist's hour in the history of regulation
came relatively late, long after other notably different hours during which the
muckraker and the lawyer alternately held center stage. This history makes it seem
unlikely that any single approach to regulation will ever triumph.
T. McCRAw, supra note 32, at 305.
92. See W. CoN~oLLY, supra note 11, at 30.
93. T. McCRAw, supra note 32, at 302-03:
[I]t seems clear that the concern about legal process has controlled the outcome
of regulation more often than has the concern about the substance of economic
efficiency. In economists' language, this means that the concern for equity has
generally triumphed over the quest for efficiency. In lawyers' terms, it means that
in regulation the judicial model has usually triumphed over the legislative and
administrative model. In cultural terms, it means that the concern for fairness and
for the protection of the diverse interests of all affected individuals has most often
won out over the concern for overall growth in the national economy. More generally
in political terms, it means that regulation is best understood as a political settlement,
undertaken in an effort to keep peace within the polity.
Overall, the conclusion appears inescapable that regulation in America has more
often functioned as a protective device rather than as a promotional or developmental
one. Of course, protection was not always inappropriate. By holding in check socially
destructive forms of behavior, protective regulation often cushioned the impact of
rapid industrial change. In America, in contrast to older societies, so many other
forces consistently acted to promote pell-mell economic growth that regulation can
hardly be condemned for not always doing so.
94. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
95. See Carter, supra note 63, at 1335-36, 1338, 1341; Sunstein, supra note 83, at 188,
